



Bachelor of Business Admlnistratlol
University of Washington, 1950





Bachelor of Business Administration
University of Washington, 1950
A Thesis Submitted to the School of Government,
Business and International Affairs of The George
Washington University in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Business Administration
April 26, 1965
Thesis directed by
Karl 3. Stromsew, Ph. D.




Monterey, .Canforwa MONTOHEY, CA W*4«1©1
PREFACE
Computer based management information systems theoretically
increase the amount of useful information which can be supplied to
top layers of management. The Secretary of Defense has attempted
to utilize this advantage of the information technology as a means
to aid decision making at his level in the Department. 3y
obtaining increased information about the operation of the
Department of Defense, the Secretary is aided in his desire to
make decisions about defense resources and policies on an overall
basis rather than in increments.
To obtain information for the Secretary of Defense, and to
Improve management of its own assets, the Department of the Navy
has been directed by the Secretary of Defense to utilize fully the
new information technology. The result is that several computer
based management information systems are being implemented through-
out the naval establishment.
Critics of the Department of the Navy's efforts to utilize
information technology feel that the Department is installing
systems too rapidly without the necessary organization or technical
ability to make effective use of new concepts in management
information. The purpose of this thesis is to explore to what
extent this criticism is warranted. Research has been directed
toward answering the question: "Is the Navy able to coordinate
ii
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properly its growing number of management information systems?"
Chapter I contains a discussion of the impacts on manage*
ment and organization which are likely to result from the new
technology, the accepted methodology for systems planning and
design, and the organization within the Navy for design and
coordination of management information systems. The content of
the chapter is intended to establish a basis from which to analyze
the tfavy Department's goals and procedures for information system
design and coordination.
Chapter II describes several of the most important Navy
management Information systems. Little attempt is made to analyze
these systems since the purpose of including them is simply to
illustrate the scope of the management. Information program in the
Navy, highlighting the large amount of management information which
must be manipulated, and the extent of overlap or duplication which
mi&ht exist.
Chapter III narrows the scope of the analysis to the actual
planning, design, and attempts to Integrate the most comprehensive
management information system in the Navy, the Uavy Maintenance
and Material Management Information System, providing a means of
determining if the Department of the Uavy has the proper
organization and technical competence to systematize its informa-
tion gathering functions.
The analysis is primarily based on research of publications
of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, the
ill
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The New Information Technology
A computer based Information system should not be
considered simply as a system to process data per Be . but should
be envisioned In the broader context of a management system for the
direction and control of an organization. Consequently, when an
information system Is being planned, pertinent management theories
and conoepts need to be taken into account. A discussion, then,
of how management theory is affected by the new information
technology Is appropriate as a background for an analysis of the
planning and coordination of management information systems in the
Navy Department.
A two-pronged result is apparent in the effeots computers
have on organizations. Organizations are ohanged as a result of
studies made possible by the computer, and they are affected by the
computers' direct lmpaot.
J. W. Forrester illustrated the first part of this
dichotomy when he studied the effect of information on organiza-
tions. By utilizing a computer for his work on the theory of
^•Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1961), p. vii.

2information-feedback systems, he was able to develop a basis for
understanding the goal-seeking, self-correcting interplay between
the parts of a business system. He did this by simulating social
systems through the use of experimental models. Social systems
are too complicated to be reduced to mathematical formulation but
can be studied through simulation since the computer is a practical
economical tool for the vast amount of information required.
In I960, academicians and industrial managers met at the
University of Chicago for the purpose of discussing the actual
applications of computers in industry. Discussing what they
called the "new information technology, " these experts observed
how management and organization are affected by the following
three areas: (1) the use of mathematical and statistical methods,
with or without the aid of electronic computers; (2) the use of
computers for mass integrated data processing; and (j>) the direct
application of computers to decision-making through simulation
techniques.
George P. Shultz and Thomas L. Whlsler, when writing about
the Chicago conference, mentioned several ways in which the
conferees thought management concepts would be changed. ^ The most
•'-George P. Shultz and Thomas L. Whisler, Management
Organization and the Computer (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1960), p. 2.
2lbld .. p. 7.
<

3far-reaching change, of course, is that managers have a greatly
increased knowledge about the organization's operation and
environment. Also, the design of systems and the use of models
require logioal, concise assumptions and judgments about the firm
in question. As a result, the machines compel managers to
formulate their decisions so much more intelligently and more
thoroughly than they ever have that they can hardly be unaware of
the shortcomings of their programs.
Shultz and Whlsler feel that this information technology
should move out the boundaries of decision making. Individual
decisions will be made by top executives which cannot be made at
high levels now. The flow of factual, day-to-day information can
be moved higher in the corporation, helping the large business to
function like the small one In which all aspects of the business
are more readily carried in mind and correlated to the decision
making process. Top management will be able to make more detailed
pdecisions, much as the top executive of a small company does nov
.
Writers such as Stahrl Edmunds have also recognized the
impact on the organization resulting from an increased flow of
Information. He has suggested that faster communications should
eliminate many of the poor or late decisions caused by an inability
^Gilbert Burk, "Will the Computer Outwit Man?," Fortune
.
October, 1964, p. 121.
Shultz and Whisler, op. clt .. p. 9.

4to force Information through layers in the organization.
Similarly, sinoe information oan flow without regard to functional
or other organizational fences, the desirable objective of
promoting common goals among executives should be more reachable.
The Chicago conferees saw the information technology as
an integration of smaller systems into larger ones. Tney pointed
out that the people most affected by such integration are those
who formerly coordinated these systems. Most of the literature
on this subject supports the premise that the ranks of direct line
supervision will be thinned, and the structure of organization
should become somewhat flatter and perhaps have fewer departmental
boundaries. Problems of interdepartmental coordination should
diminish in proportion to the scope of the development of the
pintegrated information systems.
Shultz and Whisler take a stand on the decentralization
issue. "Our argument," they say,
is that use of the high-speed computer and associated
techniques—information technology—will be a force
for centralization of decision making, along with an
expanded staff at the top levels and fewer jobs, with
more highly programmed content, at lower levels in
the management hierarchy.
3
^Stahrl Sdmunds, "The Reach of an Executive," Harvard
Business Review . January-February, 1959, p. 74.
2Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "The Real Meaning of Automation,"
Ai.ncr-.;sment Review
. June, 1963, p. 43.
^Shultz and Whisler, op. clt .. p. 28.

Other writers, suoh as John Deardon, are not as convinced
about the centralizing tendency. Most of the writers who
disagree with Shultz and Whisler claim that there will be
centralization of planning and control; however, operations will
be decentralized. There is a vague difference in the two points
of view.
Snultz and Whisler believe that decentralization has
resulted because modern industry was Just too large and complex to
be organized any other way. The advent of rapid and comprehensive
information gathering devices should eliminate the one rationale
for decentralization, the Inability to communicate rapidly in the
large organization. The largest consensus of any point discussed
at the Chicago conference was that the pressures for change
generated by the introduction of the new technology are in the
direction of centralization of decision-making, of control, and
of coordination. 2
Information System Design Methodology
Keeping in mind those management concepts likely to emerge
from a properly planned system, the next step is to examine the
relevant, recognized methodology for the planning and design of
an information system.
^-John Deardon, "Can Management Information be Automated?, "
Harvard Business .Review . March-April, 1964, p. 135.
2Shultz and Whisler, op. cit .. p. 9.

6The "total-systems approach" Is the current vogue In
systems design. It requires that a system design be completely
documented with exhaustive descriptions and blueprints. The
present and future organization must be depicted in detail, as
must the system tasks to be performed. Thus an improved informa-
tion system cannot be designed until the objectives and needs of
the organization in question are explicitly known and the existing
system is clearly understood. Nor can the new system be considered
fully implemented until it is operating and accepted
—
Intellectually and emotionally--by those who work with it.
The writings of experts in the field of systems planning
and design usually reflect agreement on several steps necessary
to accomplish this total system. The steps Include a study of the
organization, a determination of its long-range objectives, a
definition of the system being used currently, making short-range
Improvements to the existing system, establishing a time schedule
and assigning responsibility for meeting the schedule, and
accomplishment of the plan.
Study the Organization.
Judith Moss, senior systems analyst with General Electric,
believes that every organization has a unique personality which
must be understood before any meaningful and workable plans can
Ijohn E. Eyan, "Upgrading a Ooiapanyk Information System, "
Automation , August, 1964, pp. 48-52.

be made. Thus, one of the first steps in systems design is to
obtain a biography of the organization, what it does, and policies
or personnel in its management, as well as a feel for any political
or personality ramifications.
Information of this type can be obtained froai organization
and policy manuals and statistical and accounting data. The prime
source, however, is discussion with officials and operating
personnel who may be qualified to translate raw statistics into
a meaningful picture. This can also highlight contrasting views
and bring out any differences in management thinking as well as
an awareness of present problems and possible solutions.
With such background information on the organization, it
is then possible to delve into the objectives of the program.
Who Initiated it? What level of management has approved it? Will
it be conducted by insiders, a consultant, or an equipment
manufacturer? Are the stated objectives, if any, realistic, too
narrow, or too broad?
Other questions that should be resolved include: Is the
program being initiated because of some obvious failure in the
current operations? Or because some improvement can be made?
Are there any time restrictions on the study? What constraints
have been set by existing management policies? A very obvious
1Judith Moss, "Planning a Management Information System,"
Automation . August, 1964, p. 58.

8constraint, of oourne, is tho budget allowed for the study. This
muat be realistic la terms of objectives and complexities.
Determine the Long Range Objectives
The long range objectives (3*5 years) and a design for an
information processing system that will enable the organization to
operate more effectively with minimized managed costs must be
determined. 2 The objectives are determined by visualizing the
general nature of the organization five years hence, including
probable changes in end produot (mission or tasks in the military)
and major changes in physical assets, and the external demands
upon the organization. With a general concept of these conditions
mind, the next step is to visualize the information and data
required by each element of the organization to enable the whole
to meet these demands. These information requirements range from
those needed by the productive worker in a shop section to those
needed by the genaral manager for decision-making, planning and
control purposes.-'
Development of such "system specifications" is a job which
requires participation on the part of all functional management.
But such participation must be on a functionally unbiased basis,
and pi—Wing at this stage must be done without regard zo how the
1
I±iid., P. 39.
2tfestinghouse Corporation, 'iiasluess Systems Analysis and
Planaiii lanning ilanual, not dated, p. 2.
3d, | 4 Stroller and R. L. Van Horm, "Design of a Management
Information System, " The liand Oorporation, P-1362, November 22,
1958, p. 3.

organization is currently structured or how the system operates
now.
System objectives may be precise, such as requiring that
each supervisor be provided daily with a detailed schedule of his
manpower and workload for the next three days. Or the objectives
may be phrased more broadly, stating that certain actions will be
accomplished in a specified time period. In any case, one of
the objectives will always be to reduce managed cost by specific,
scheduled amounts with predetermined contributions to efficiency.
Following the system specification stage is the creative
process of planning and designing the new system. Planning and
design is considered the most critical element in the success of
the entire program by some writers on systems design. It is the
phase in which the highest conceptual skills of the professional
systems man must be brought to bear to insure complete integration
of the various subsystems which eventually constitute the total
system. Concurrently with this process, an analysis of the present
system should be undertaken.
The Present System
A detailed analysis of the present system is useful and
economically Justifiable from several standpoints. First, such
•^-Robert D. Bernhard, "Providing Timely Production Data,"
Automation . March, 1964, p. 50.
2Alan D. Meacham and Van B. Thompson, Total Systems
(American Data Processing, Inc., 1962).
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analysis reveals Improvements that can be made without basic
systems changes. These are improvements from which savings can
be realized quickly and in quantity sufficient usually to pay
for the investment in time and effort involved. Second, the
analysis provides the starting point for planning the intermediate
systems Involved in the transition to the ultimate system. Third,
the analysis provides an invaluable "check list" of system
requirements, preventing small but important details from being
overlooked in the planning of the ultimate system.
The large number of facts gathered on the present system
must be arranged in such a manner as to be adequately understood. 2
To facilitate arranging the facts, some specific analytical
techniques are used by large corporations and are described in
textbooks on the subject. These techniques include multi-
dimensional flow charting, input-output analysis, physical layout
of the system, and identification of managed costs.
Multi-dimensional flow charting organizes facts in order
to trace the flow of data from origin to destination. Plow
charting arranges this flow in chronological sequence of operations
as Information progresses through the organization, summarizing the
entire procedure in simple, precise form that enables more
lMoss
» op. cit .. p. 59.
2Westinghouse Corporation, op. cit .. pp. 81-86.
^Victor Lazzaro, Systems and Procedures (Snglewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1959), pp. 71-34.
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objective study of all the parts. The dimensions of volume, time,
oost and physical distance for each step are Included. Each is
an important factor in any considered plan for mechanization or
other improvement; depicting them on the chart for each processing
stage aids in objective analysis. The flow charting process may
be liicened to the product flow charts used by manufacturing
plants, or the mathematician's use of symbols.
Each step revealed by the flow chart should be examined
and questioned critically: Does it contribute fully to the end
objective of the organization? Is it necessary at all?
Determining the true reason for a step being done often
establishes that it is no longer necessary. Is this the best time
and place in the processing cycle for it to be done? Is there
a simpler, easier, less costly way to do it? Asking each of
these questions at every step will result in consideration of all
the possibilities for improvement of the existing process. The
flow charting principle can be expanded into other useful areas of
analysis such as forms flow and distribution, punched card and
computer procedures, and organizational process flow.
Input-output analysis is the visual portrayal of the
source data going into a system and the documents being generated
as output. 2 Efficient systems design requires that all Input data
llbid., pp. 33-62.
^Richard N. Schmidt and William E. Beyers, Electronic




entering the system be useful, that duplication of data input be
eliminated, and that costly rehandllng after the first stage be
eliminated. Most of the information required for this type of
analysis is already available from the process flow charts. The
input-output chart simply rearranges it in a format that will
facilitate comprehension and quickly point up duplication of effort.
The principal benefits are
:
(1) Elimination of repeated processing of the 3ame
Information—one of the most costly and wasteful practices, yet
one of the most difficult to recognize in a complicated system.
(2) Minimized regeneration of information— the handling
and rehandllng of Identical data.
(3) 3aBier and more objective appraisal of mechanization
feasibility. Analysis of this type is useful in bringing out the
full potential of mechanization.
A new system or systems revision must be coordinated with
a plan for proper layout. Space and layout surveys trace the flow
of work among people, desks, files and equipment. Superimposing
this flow on a two or preferably three-dimensional scale layout
of shop and office areas provides the visual means for recognizing
and analyzing ineffective use of available space. Typical
accomplishments include:
(1) Eliminating backtracking and bottlenecks.
(2) Conserving the use of space and energy by eliminating
detours and paper shuffling.
^Lazzaro, op. cit .. p. 49.
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(3) Improving working' conditions by minimizing physical
transport and providing physical proximity of required facilities.
(4) Reducing lines of communication.
The final step in defining the present system is to
identify the managed cost involved and the functional and "people"
responsibility for each element of cost, including the effects of
performance in one function upon managed costs in another.
Identification of cost is necessary in order to put the present
system into dollar perspective. It will also provide a basis for
selecting areas of greatest potential efficiency, insure that the
proper operating personnel are brought into the picture at the
right time, and point out to these people their responsibility for
managed costs in the operation in functions other than their own.
Recommendations for improvements in a given function must
always be considered in relation to their effect upon other
departments and personnel, itfost have to do with the main stream
of the organization and therefore impinge upon many related areas.
Logistics, for example, is closely related to operations,
maintenance and other functions.
2
Make Short-Ran,a;e Improvements
Making short-range improvements utilizes the pay-as-you-go
principle and is one of the common short-range goals. Throughout
-^estinghouse Corporation, op. clt .. p. 55.
9
Moss, op. cit .. p. 60.
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the analysis of the existing system, factual information is being
gathered and digested--good ideas are being sifted out and
tentative improvements identified. Many of these improvements
are of a nature that can be effected immediately without changing
the long-range objectives, as a result of eliminating or combining
steps, changing the sequence of operations, reducing delay time,
and otherwise simplifying procedures. Often these changes can be
implemented without appreciably disturbing normal activities.
Most systems analyses to date have demonstrated an ability to
(1) produce immediate savings in excess of the cost of the program;
(2) contribute markedly to improved efficiency; (3) provide
step-by-step accomplishments toward the longer-range objectives;
and (4) develop the knowledge and skill essential to eventual
integration of systems.
Care must be taken, however, to insure that such improve-
ments are in fact fully compatible with long-range objectives;
otherwise, they become false economies and may slow progress toward
the ultimate system.
Establish a Time Schedule
A time schedule must be established and responsibility
assigned for accomplishment of the long-range objective. The
lengthy and far-reaching nature of most long-range systems studies
^-McKinsey and Company, Inc., A Survey of Twenty-seven
^oT7




requires that each phase be carefully planned, responsibilities
assigned and a schedule developed for its accomplishment. This
need becomes particularly critical when a Joint effort is
involved. Without it inertia develops that must ultimately be
overcome. 1
Full consideration must be given to the interrelationships
of different phases of the program. Working within the broad
confines of the study as a whole, it is then possible to schedule
and assign each of the phases, making use of overlapping or
parallel actions and other time-saving devices in order to meet
the schedule. Minor adjustments can be made as circumstances
dictate, but always within the context of the total plan.
Accomplish the Plan
With proper preplanning, orientation, and training of
personnel, accomplishment of the plan can then proceed logically
to completion. Bach step must be documented fully to insure that
the solution fulfills the objectives; alternatives are weighed;
equipment considered; conversion procedures are developed and
tested; physical requirements are determined; controls are
developed; installation and follow-up are carried out according to
2plan; and results measured.
Iwestlnghouse Corporation, op. cit .. p. 9.
2
Ibid ., p. 10.
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Successful accomplishment requires follow-up to Insure
that all replaced procedures have actually been discontinued,
that til prxts of the new system are in operation, and that
results live up to expectations. Subsequent review on a periodic
basis should also be formulated.
Throughout the development and installation of the program
the long-range objectives should be reexamined and modified as
necessary in the light of changing conditions. The best long-
range plan is a flexible one, and it can be expected that changes
in it will be necessary as implementation progresses.
To accomplish a major systems improvement requires that
the responsibility for system analysis, design, and planning be
o
vested in a single person. In this manner the neoessary
coordination between functions and the resolution of different
points of view oan be obtained. Because all functions of the
organization are involved, the program director should fill a
staff position reporting no more than one step down from the head
of the organization.
^Henry H. Albers, Organized iixooutlve Action (}ew York:
John I ley <& Sons, 1962), p. 423.
... Davis, "Military Information System Design
Techniques, " ed. Edward Sennet, Military Information Systems
(New York: Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 25.
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Assignment of the responsibility to a committee in which
all members participate on a part-time basis will likely delay
the project and reduce its ultimate effectiveness. Committee
action will also be extremely susceptible to functional bias by
the stronger members.
Ruth Davis of the Mitre Corporation suggests that the
responsibility requires the full time of a man who knows the
techniques of system analysis and is capable of grasping new and
advanced systems concepts and talcing full advantage of their
application in the organization.
Train the Assigned Personnel
Because this program involves relatively new concepts,
there is a need for training of the individuals who will be
3
assigned the responsibility for carrying it out. Moreover, the
rapid pace of technological development requires that training be
updated periodically. Training and indoctrination will probably
be the key to how successful the installation of the new system
will be. Even before conducting a feasibility study, and definitely
before installing the system, personnel must be conditioned for
change
.
iGordon L. Lippit, "When is a Committee Necessary?,"
American Society of Association Executives Journal . VIII, h
(October, 1956), p. 5.
2Davls, op. cit .. p. 27.
^Albers, op. cit .. p. 423.
^"Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 195o), p. 133.
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The Navy Management Information Program
Initially in this chapter the Impact of the "information
technology" on management and organization as observed by
academicians such as J. \i , Jforrester and Thomas Whisler was
described. In addition, the recognized methodology for designing
computer based information systems was discussed. This design
methodology is recommended by the mo3t successful practitioners
of systems design in current writings on the subject.
It is interesting to note that an instruction published
by the Department of the Navy in 1959 entitled, "Data Processing
In ^ravy Management Information Systems," contained many of the
same concepts which have been discussed here. The Secretary of
the Navy indicated in the above publication that he had a fairly
clear idea in the late 1950* s as to what was required to implement
a fully integrated management information system. While the
methodology proposed by the Secretary of the Navy at that time
was not completely refined, it nevertheless encompassed most of
the procedures in systems design which are now proposed by
industrial and independent analysts.
In 1959, the Navy was completing the fourth stage of a
plan calling for six stages of automatic data processing
applications. The six stages cover the years from 1940 until 1970.
%. S. Department of the Navy, Secifevlnst P10462.7,




Stage four was the first stage during which equipment that was
actually feasible for the job intended for it was procured in
quantity. Stage four was described by the Secretary of the Navy
as essentially an initial acquisition and earliest feasible
applications, quick pay-off, and pilot installation period.
During stage four the responsibility for planning and
implementing ADP applications at appropriate facilities fell to
the individual managing bureaus . Only towards the end of the
Initial implementation was it suggested that the management
bureaus and major offices collaborate towards developing overall
Navy management information systems plans.
During stage five, which is now nearly complete, the plans
call for a much more comprehensive application of automatic data
processing in the Navy Department. The objective of stage five
is as follows
:
The objective of this stage is not only to bring
about substantial improvements during it in the use
of ADPS in management. The objective is also, at
or near its end, to have equipped the Navy with a full
complement of systems equipment and personnel having
the capability of achieving the long-range objectives
of this program, insofar as the kind of equipment
labelled "ADPS" can contribute. It will remain for
stage 6 to convert the capability to a perfected
routine actuality.
^
1Ibid .. p. II-2.




The long-range objectives envisioned for stage six Include
an integrated system as indicated by the following description:
It is expected that early in this stage the Navy
will have Installed (and interconnected), a full
range of ADP equipment, with adequate technical
personnel on board, having the capability to attain
all the long-range objectives of this program. It
is expected that at the end of this stage, those
objectives will be routinely achieved throughout the
Navy in actual hourly operations. Therefore,
developmental activity during the period will be
chiefly in the perfection of the best ways and means
for management to constitute Itself and use the
advanced hardware and technical personnel—with a
very high degree of common characteristics Navy-wide.
The end result of stage 6 should then be the ultimate
exploitation of "Automatic Data Processing Systems"
.,
in AN INTEGRATED NAVT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM. 1
The above referenced instruction, published in 1959,
suggested that many of the management concepts as seen by the
academicians would be embraced in the Navy. Furthermore, it
explained how the Navy should go about making this happen. For
instance, it described in some detail the benefits which would
accrue from a feasibility study and the procedures to follow in
conducting a feasibility study. It also outlined the procedures
to be followed in order to design the system, e.g., input
2
analysis, output analysis and work flow diagraming.
The instruction had outlined In considerable detail the
Navy's goal in setting up its management information system, but
i lbld .. p. II-4.
2 Ibid., pp. IV-1, VI-6.
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Tailed to establish concrete bureau-by-bureau objectives. The
instruction indicated that the Secretary of the Nary knew what
should be done in the management information area; nevertheless, hie
office failed to stimulate the bureaus to move forward rapidly in
installing management information systems. The most glaring
example of this alleged failure is that the Navy's bureaus did not
begin implementing comprehensive computer based management
information systems until seven years after the Air Force had
installed workable systems. This belated action was not taken
until the Department of Defense, in effect, ordered that it be
done. 2
While it appears that the Navy has been slow in embracing
the information technology in management systems, it does not
necessarily follow that the systems which are being installed are
poorly designed. The purpose of the following chapters will be
to explore to what degree the JIavy has been able to utilize the
recognized methodology for the design and coordination of
information systems, and to what extent the expected impacts of
the new technology have materialized.
XU. S. Department of the Navy, OPNAV INST 4700.16, Standard
Navy Maintenance Management System . March 8, 1963, p. 1.
2U. S. Department of Defense, DOD INST 4700.19, Baulpment
f




NAVY. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
To illustrate the magnitude of the task and the problems
involved in designing and coordinating management Information
systems within the Navy, it will be useful to briefly describe
several of the more important systems being implemented. The
systems described here do not represent all the Navy systems;
even so, these systems will indicate to what degree there is
overlap and duplication Inherent in the present individual bureau-
by-bureau approach to obtaining management Information.
Considerable detail as to the objectives, the source data entering
the system, and the management products derived will be included
under the assumption that these will be the areas in which possible
duplications might exist.
Navy Post Information System (NQIS )
One of the most comprehensive systems in the Navy is
its cost information system, which parallels the functional
responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial




for NOIS, Is developing the system in conjunction with
1
representatives of all major components of the Navy Department.
The system will be the financial information component of any
integrated Navy management information system. It is a functional
system that crosses organizational lines, for the scope of the
NCI3 includes any unit that maintains and reports cost data used
2
by higher levels in the Navy Department.
The Navy Comptroller claims that NOIS is playing an
important role in the planning-programming-budgeting-appraisal
cycle. It is intended to be the vehicle for the input of
financial data which, when wedded to program data, becomes a
meaningful expression for management decisions, review and
appraisal.
The first phase of a financial management improvement
program which includes NOIS will reshuffle the Navy financial
management system to consolidate all aspects of the five-year
force structure and finanoial program, budgetary requirements, and
the accounting system into one compatible streamlined system. The
^Victor Longstreet, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management, Informal remarks made to the author on
February 4, 196-5.
2Cdr John W. McOabe, "Navy Cost Information System,"
unpublished paper produced for the Office of the Navy Comptroller,
Washington, D. C. , 1962.
^Interview with Robert Green, Office of the Navy
Comptroller, Data Processing, November, 1964.
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consolidated system is intended to satisfy Navy needs as well as
the requirements of the Department of Defense. At present, the
computer-supported Navy Cost Information System supplies
statistical data used in the compilation of the five-year force
structure and financial program; whereas the accounting system
furnishes data for the basio budgetary requirements. Sometimes
the material is compatible, but frequently, valid comparisons are
difficult because of the disparate data bases. So, the first
major step in the improvement program is to insure compatibility
of all data from which financial management information is
derived.
1
After accomplishing this goal, the plan is to adapt the
system to the associated systems such as personnel, procurement,
facilities, supply and contract management. Accounting, budgeting,
programming, data processing, auditing, and management engineering
personnel have been marshalled to help reach both goals. The
consulting firm of Management 3ystem3, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
o
is also assisting in a system design.
The primary motivation for an improved Information system
came when the Secretary of Defense instituted the concept of
programming Department of Defense objectives on a total resource
^Walter J. Kennevan, "Automation and Financial Management
in the Navy," The Armed Forces Oomptroller . December, 1964, p. 25.
2£ear Admiral Korris flirsch, Deputy Oomptroller, Department




basis. This forced the Navy into a need for providing data on
forces and their costing on a different basis than was called for
by the existing management and financial structure. The financial
data on forces had to be compatible with the programming structure
as well as the existing appropriation structure. At the same
time, the Navy and Marine Corps did not want to distort their
programs and financing.
In August, 1962, the Office of the Comptroller in the Navy
Department published a description of the inputs and outputs of
this system in a pamphlet entitled, "Program Change Control System
in the Department of the Navy." The inputs are in the form of
standard accounting data with one important exception: the
individual items are coded according to each major program aspect
such as activity, item, appropriation, etc.
With the aid of computers the Ilavy Comptroller is able to
use these data to produce management reports or outputs having
several use3. The Secretary of Defense for his analysis receives
costs in terms of program elements subdivided into three
categories: research and development, investment, and operations.
The Department of Defense budget requirements for cost information
are presented in terms of appropriation and subdivision listing.
The Navy accumulates data in terms of the force structure, the
^U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
NAVEXOS P-2416, Program Change Control System in the Department of
the Navy, August, 1964, p. 5-2.

26
supporting forces and related oosts. Finally, for purposes of
cost effectiveness measurements and weapon decisions, reports
relate forces to procurement items, research and development,
military construction projects, and the associated costs.
These management products relate to financial management
for six years, in that they involve current operations, are used
for budget year calculation, and enter planning considerations
projected another four years. The ongoing year operations must be
reported in terms of the outputs. Working in the other direction,
whenever a budget is constructed or a change to the five year
force structure is contemplated, the financial information must
also be convertible into each of the outputs.
It was originally intended that all financial Information
would flow from the field activities through the Navy Finance
Centers to the Navy Comptroller, and subsequently be distributed
to anyone having a need for it. The bureaus disliked having the
information pass through the finance channels before they had
access to it and forced a change so that data would be collected
3
and analyzed by the bureaus and then sent to the finance centers.
Mr. Robert Green, data processing specialist in the Navy
Comptroller's Office, has described how the activity oost
llbid., p. 5-3.
2lbid., p. 5-4.
^Hirsch, loc. clt .
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information is actually made into line item information and program
information by machine processing. Following is the flow of the
system as he described it: (1) the accounting at the cost center
level is tied into the five-year force structure by coding;
(2) at the bureau level the accounting information is placed on a
machine in order to prepare tapes for the Navy Comptroller; (3) the
Navy Comptroller then analyzes this tape information on the
finance center machine and sends tapes to the Navy Command Control
System Support Activity where the data are processed and reports
are prepared in the form of program elements.
Related systems under development Include one by the
Chief of Naval Operations which is a ship planning system. The
system is intended to provide and maintain current data on ship
inventory and status, conversion and overhaul schedules, ship
equipment allowances, and tempo of operations. The ship planning
data will be identified to naval cost centers to insure that
ships forces and their associated costs are aligned to the same
program element. A similar system is being developed for
p
aircraft.
Cost and Economic Information System (OBIS )
Cost and Economic Information Systems are presently being
established throughout the Defense establishment. The systems are
^Green, loc cit .
p
Program Change Control System, loc. cit .
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intended to close that portion of the cost information loop
outside the Department of Defense. Oost and Economic Information
Systems collect and analyze actual and estimated cost and related
information pertaining to the acquisition of weapons systems and
major items of equipment. The systems also collect and analyze
employment and related economic impact data.
By establishing these systems the Secretary of Defense
intends to improve cost estimating, cost and price analysis, and
program reporting. Such improvement should enhance the
effectiveness of planning, programming, budgeting, contract
negotiating and program or projeot management. The economic Impact
data will enable the Secretary of Defense to analyze contracting
impact by geographic area and industry.
This last objective is a touchy subject, and one that
most federal officials are loath to discuss. With this information
the Secretary of Defense can assess the economic effects of slowing
procurement, speeding it up or terminating contracts. Action can
then be taken to minimize or maximize this impact, depending on
p
the circumstances.
The Oost and Economic Information System develops
comparable cost and related data on weapons systems and major items
^U. S. Department of Defense Directive 7041.1, Oost and
Economic Information System . July 7, 1964, p. 1.
2 Intervlew with T. W. Harris, U. S. Department of the Navy,
Office of Navy Material, November 12, 1964.
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of equipment, Oost data encompass the full acquisition cycle
(research, development, engineering, preproduction and production)
for uniformly defined systems, subsystems, major components (such
as propulsion, guidance, structure, support equipment) and other
activities for aircraft, missiles, space systems, ships, electronic
systems, armor, ordnance and other weapons and support systems.
Economic data will encompass plant and geographic employment data
on Department of Defense contractors.
Data sources include contractor reports and reports
prepared in-house by Department of Defense components (i.e.,
reports or procurement and industrially funded activities). The
reach of the system should extend to the third tier of
subcontractors
.
As the Navy*s part in this system, it will be expected to
p
establish one or more cost analysis organizations to:
1. Organize and manage the Oost and Economic Information
System as a single integrated system.
2. Insure the validity, comparability and timeliness of
actual cost and related data obtained from contractors.
3. Develop techniques for cost estimating and analysis.
4. Provide a oentral point of storage and retrieval of
data.
^•Interview with Commander Robert S. Haley, U. S. Department
of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons, Accounting and Budgeting,
November 5, 1964.
2D0D DIR 7041.1, op. cit .. p. 2.
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5. Make available analyses of cost and related data within
the Department of Defense to program, budget and contract analysts,
program or project managers, Industrial readiness planners and
economic analysts.
The Navy Department must assure coordination between the
appropriate cost analysis organization and the weapon system or
equipment project manager in applying uniform wor£ breakdown
structures, standardized cost definitions and data validation.
Additionally, other systems providing the same or similar cost
Information must be identified and eliminated in order to avoid
duplication of efiort. eventually the Oost and Jjlconomic
Information System will be integrated with other systems (including
PilRX/Cost) used for accumulating cost information.
The computer will fit into this system at several points.
It is envisioned that major contractors and subcontractors will
collect the necessary data for the required reports and place it
on their machines. These machines and the machines at the cost
analysis centers will exchange information in machine readable
forms. Within the Defense establishment information will be passed
from machine to machine depending on the need for the particular
data. Then, at some future time, a central data bank for
information which is applicable to more than one cost analysis
center can be established.
^Haley, lou. cit .
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The Navy Maintenance and Material Management
Information System (MMMIS )
The Department of Defense has directed that each service
have a Maintenance Management Information System based on computer
technology to ensure rapid measurement and reporting of military
readiness, economic effectiveness, and engineering deficiencies
concerning wer material.
The objectives of the Standard Navy MMMIS will be to
provide a uniform system for reporting pertinent information
regarding all maintenance performed afloat and ashore. The materia:
management portion of the MMMIS is more in the nature of a
supporting endeavor to assure that appropriate materials are
2
available on a timely basis to those concerned ^ith maintenance.
This system will integrate and distribute maintenance data
which are being documented in a uniform data collection system
referred to as the Maintenance Planning and Control System.
Uniform malntenanoe-action documentation and uniform maintenance-
information reports to management are implied by MMMIS.
*
In addition, MMMIS has the potential of accommodating
cost standards and effectiveness measures as management tools.
^Interview with Jack Whltten, 'J. S. Department of the Navy,
Bureau of lfavs.1 Vfeapons, (7VHP), November 5, 1964.
2 U. S. Department of the Uavy, Instruction 4700.16,
Standard Navy Maintenance Management System . March 8, 1963, p. 1.
^Frank W. Segal, "Maintenance and Material Management
Information System Research Considerations, " Technical Memorandum,
Logistic Research Project, The George Washington University,
February 13, 1964, p. 4.
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Different effectiveness measures, such as a military worth measure
designed for use at the managerial level, can be integrated into
a uniform MMMIS. Similarly, an operational readiness measure
such as a Material Readiness Index can be utilized at various
administrative levels through a MMMIS. The Navy's complex weapons
require management techniques such as cost accounting,
effectiveness measures, and operational readiness measures for
efficient management and operation.
Most of the Navy effort to date has been expended on the
input side of the system. A comprehensive program has been under-
way for several years to standardize maintenance publications,
planning, procedures, and terminology throughout the Navy. Also,
a detailed research effort has been undertaken concerning
documentation. First, the needs for maintenance information at
all levels were determined by statistical sampling. Then, a
standard source document was developed as the result of a detailed
study of selected maintenance activities, based on the needs for
2information at higher levels.
Research has also been done on the reports required after
the source information is gathered. The Office of Naval Research
has almost completed this stage of the implementation program.
x Ibld .. pp. 5-10.
2 Interview with Dr. Robert Lundegard, U. S. Department of
the Navy, Office of Naval Research, Oode 436, December 9, 1964.
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To a considerable extent the required reports determine
the type of machine installation. The plan now is to have key
punch operations aboard ships and stations and then send the cards
to a centr-1 facility. Some base complexes will have computers to
prepare loc^l reports; however, duplicate machine cards will be
3ect to the central data facility for processing and preparation
of bureau and department reports. This central processing will be
done at The George .fashington University for about two years and
then be phased over to a central Navy facility.
The program has several problems. The intent of the
system is that only one document -will be required at the
maintenance activity for all maintenance and supply actions. The
accuracy of this input is a problem. Also, many records such as
aircraft log booics are to be eliminated, which is difficult because
of a certain reluctance by many to trust the system.
The output of the oentral processing facility will be in
three forms: (1) periodic reports; (2) reports generated by an
action taking place outside of established parameters; and (3)
reports resulting from an inquiry. Coordination and standardization
of these reports within the limits of the system and the needs of
the manager will be difficult.
The integration of the maintenance information system with
the supply system is presently causing some difficulty. For
^-Interview with Commander W. B. Fannin, U. S. Department
of the Navy, Office of Naval Research, Code 436, November 5, 1964.
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Instance, the intention of the maintenance managers is to use the
document recording the maintenance as a requisition document.
Department of Defense requirements for uniform supply documents
thwart efforts in this direction.
This system is an attempt by the military to take
advantage of the management concepts made possible by the new
information technology. Mathematical and statistical models are
used for military worth and cost effectiveness measures. There is
mass data processing, and simulation procedures are used for
planning and scheduling. Through these measures the ability of
top Department of Defense managers to make decisions, to control
and to coordinate Defense activities should be enhanced.
Personnel Management Systems
The systems used in the Bureau of Personnel are not in
the strictest sense management Information systems. They are
inventory control systems, with people constituting the inventory.
Since most of the management information systems in the Navy list
the gathering of personnel information as one of their objectives,
it is Important that the personnel management systems be meshed
with the other systems. Therefore, as an aid in determining if




personnel accounting system are discussed here*
An attempt to more effectively coordinate personnel
planning with weapons system planning is evident in two personnel
systems. tfOGtf is the code name for the i3niisved Personnel
Simulation System. OAPKI is the acronym for the Computerized
Advanced Personnel Requirements Information program.^
The .anilsted Personnel Simulation System (N09V) is Intended
to horizontally measure the manpower skills in the Javy through a
projection of personnel inventory by rating of Hzvy iiulisted
Classification. MOON gives the iavy the capability to correlate
the manpower "experience" strength of the navy-wide skills and the
skill requirements for projected programs. :*any variables, su-
as changes in policy or ffffti tlSM| can be tea ted on mathematical
models by the bureau to determine projected requirements. She
bureau intends to buy experience quickly for its managers through
these simulation procedures. 4
While MOON is used for horizontal measurement, the tfavy
plans to use OAPtfl to provide a vertical measurement and
integration of manpower skills. The priory objective is to
Integrate personnel planning and training with the development and
installation of new weapon systems, in effect, personnel will be
»» «—
—
»wii \mm»*m~—*m*mm**m* \mm in»w mmk> ^noww •.*..«.» #- *» » »it»n wiiiwii m iww
^Captain Nicholas Brango, U. S. Department of the Savy,
Bureau of iiavai Personnel, .uddrees before the *Vj Jfiaanoial





considered as a subsystem of a particular weapon system so that
both will be planned concurrently, ensuring the availability of
trained people when the weapon system goes on line. MOON will
monitor progress, detect difficulties and 3ignal the information
necessary to allow correction, ifost of the poor timing and
coordination of new crews and new construction should thus be
eliminated.
The above projects are operating in addition to the long
established personnel accounting systems, These systems depend
primarily on the standard reporting methods normally used in
administration, and use machines only as a means of maintaining
files on tape. Source document; automation is not presently being
instituted, since up to now it has presented Insurmountable
problems.
^
The three main areas of personnel information which over-
lap several bureaus are skills, costs and distribution by activity.
An analysis of the coordination of several systems ^ay indicate
where this information can be more efficiently integrated. M0OI
and OAPRI certainly seem to constitute a step in that direction.
Medical Information System
The objective of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is to
achieve an integrated data processing system which permits the




in the core of a patient. An integrated system includes admission
data, diagnoses, treatments, response to treatment and patient
disposition. The recording of workload factors involved in
providing direct and indirect patient care is one of the major
benefits of the system.
The central file of the system is to he located at the
Medioal Center, Bethesda, Maryland. The second tier of
administration is located in several regional centers throughout
the United 3tates. The source information is generated at the
local installation level and forwarded to the regional centers.
In turn, the regional centers furnish statistical data and medical
information to the local units as neoessary, and to Bethesda in
summary form
•
The accumulation of a data bank of clinical and statistical
data is extremely valuable to the bureau. The ultimate goal,
however, as seen by many in the medioal service, is the integration
of clinical and management data collection, consolidation and
analysis. The Integration aids immeasurably in the planning and
development of facilities in addition to the professional benefits
2derived.
*U. S. Department of the Havy, Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery, NAVM2D P-5069, Data Processing Management Handbook
.
Washington, D. 0., 1964, p. 5.
2?, G. Anderson, Jr., "Automatic Data Processing and
Hospitals," (Unpublished Term Paper, BA 218, The George Washington
University, 1965).
t*m s ^ I
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Facilities Information System
The Bureau of Yards and Docks is developing an Integrated
data processing capability to meet its business data, engineering
simulation and engineering computational needs. At the present
time, accounting information and limited engineering reliability
information constitute the scope of the program. However, the
bureau has a contract with Management Technology, Incorporated to
develop an integrated capability for a comprehensive system which
will include both administrative and engineering information.
Shipyard Management Information System2
The Bureau of Ships has not been aggressive in developing
modern information systems. The closest set-up it has to an
automated information system is the shipyard data processing system.
This supplies detailed financial information and provides reports
for standards usage, work center performance, direct labor analysis,
schedule performance, and force distribution. The capability
exists for making long-range workload forecasts on the basis of
ship overhaul or conversion requirements.
^U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Yards and
Docks, Plan for Establishment of ADP Installations . August 5, 1964.
2U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Ships,




The bureau plans to integrate its data processing under
the control of the Data Systems Polioy Group chaired by the
Assistant Chief of the Bureau for Administration. It is
anticipated that automatic data processing (ADP) in the many field
activities will be linked with ADP at the Bureau in specified
critical information areas. This would present the Bureau with
a management information center covering most aspects of ship
building and repair functions.
The Maintenance and Material Management Information System
previously described will provide the Bureau of Ships with
maintenance information relative to all ships. The information
systems for fleet maintenance, shipyard repair, and new
construction are interrelated. No written policy guidance
explaining how all these information sources would be integrated
has been made available to the author.
Reliability Assurance Program-*-
Data retrieval and computer analysis are integral parts of
the reliability assurance program used in the development of naval
weapon systems. The computer provides the means to correlate and
integrate data from three main areas of the reliability cycle.
**U. S. Department of the Navy, Special Projects Office,
"Reliability Maturity Index, " (memorandum description of the




Starting with prediction, the computer aids in
establishing reliability specifications and general operating
parameters for the reliability framework of the system under
consideration. It is then used in the reliability analysis and
evaluation of designs prior to release to ensure that all selected
parts meet the system environmental and life requirements. This
function is aided by analysis and evaluation of operational
performance reports received from the field. After analysis and
classification the data are worked into various reliability files
and models. The feedback data of field or test stand operational
performance given to the reliability and prediction groups are
what makes reliability assurance effective.
Several other systems are closely aligned to this system
and have as one of their objectives the retrieval of reliability
information.
Uniform Automatic Data Processing Systems
Industrial Naval Air Stations*
for
The primary objective of the Bureau of Weapons in
implementing this system is to keep a high percentage of fleet
aircraft and missiles in the air—or ready for launching. To do
this the Bureau has planned real-time data processing systems for
"4j. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons,
Improved gleet Readiness Through Automatic Data Processing Systems
for Industrial Naval Air Stations (a pamphlet prepared by the
Radio Corporation of America, undated), pp. 1-16.

41
Industrial Naval Air Stations. These systems will do a management
information task in four major areas: Fleet Readiness, Overhaul
and Repair, Supply, and Finance.
*
Fleet Readiness involves responsibility for making
expeditious allocation of the fleet workload among various Overhaul
and Repair facilities. To carry out this mission, the Fleet
Readiness Representative must be Immediately aware of the exact
capabilities at the various Overhaul and Repair facilities and
supporting activities at any given time and for the foreseeable
future. He also must assure that adequate equipment and personnel
are available throughout various levels of support and repair
activities, and be completely informed regarding immediate and
anticipated workload. The Bureau of Naval Weapons feels that the
successful execution of the Fleet Readiness function demands an
ability to directly interrogate a central data bank. In simpler
terms, the Fleet Readiness Representative must be able to push a
button and get an immediate answer.
Overhaul and Repair use of the systems is planned primarily
for workload control. Workload control involves the planning,
scheduling and control of labor, material, and production
facilities whicn are required to meet Fleet Readiness dates.
Workload control, therefore, encompasses three major functions:
Planning, Scheduling and Reporting.
^Letter by Captain J. A. Laurich, Q. S. Department of the
Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons, Data Processing Officer, 1964.
u
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Planning--The Overhaul and Repair Department (O&R) Is
notified periodically of the number and type of aircraft to be
delivered, and the dates on which they are to be returned to the
fleet. From Work History Piles, the O&R requirements for each
aircraft are determined. Bach major work assembly (engine,
undercarriage, etc.) is "exploded" to determine total parts
requirements. These totals are processed against Ready for Issue
inventories, Previous Commitments and Replacement Histories. The
result leads to determination of the net parts needed for the
manufacturing or ordering cycle. Simultaneously, labor
availability records are assessed in order to schedule the required
man-hours
.
Scheduling—As aircraft are received by O&R, man-hours
are scheduled, material is requisitioned, and work stations
reserved. A detailed work procedure is issued which identifies
the number and sequence of operations to be performed on each unit.
This application also requires the capability of complete
rescheduling to accommodate priority work orders.
Reporting—Execution of this schedule triggers release
of information required to control production, order material,
handle employee pay records, and provide comprehensive cost data.
Supply (Material Oontrol) involves up to 10,000 daily
transactions. To meet the needs of this application, the data
processing equipment must gather, process and distribute data
relating to 250,000 to 350,000 stock items worth a half-billion
-
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dollars or more at each Industrial naval air station.
Financing this operation is a complicated undertaking.
In view of such a massive production and inventory problem it is
apparent that the data processing system must provide a
comprehensive accounting so that the exact amount of each trans-
action can be recorded and summarized for the Comptroller. The
Comptroller Department provides technical guidance, coordination
and advice in budget preparation, review and execution; recommends
allocation of civilian personnel to departments and programs
;
develops and monitors data collection systems for program
performance analysis and progress reporting; provides accounting
and disbursing services; and maintains a program of internal
review and assistance.
The first management information became available from
this system on approximately March 1, 1965, and will grow in
volume throughout 1965.^"
Military Essentiality Through Readiness Indices (METRI )
METRI is primarily an analytical technique; however, it
will depend for its practical use on a detailed information
retrieval system. The definite similarities between this program
and the Maintenance and Material Management Information System,





Implementing, are pertinent to an analysis of information system
coordination in the Navy. The concepts of material readiness
models in each program are especially alike.
The Office of Research and Development of the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts contracted with the research firm of Clark,
Cooper, Field and Wohl to develop an improved decision making
technique for the Bureau. What the Bureau needed was a concept
which would integrate the vast amount of fragmented information
concerning material condition into a structure from which
decisions could be made. KETRI was the result.
Clark and Cooper et al. explain KETRI as a technology to
quantitatively measure and report on certain aspects of the
readiness of military units to carry out defined missions and to
provide a valid basis for decision-making.
The technique is based on construction of a model to
represent the fleet in total, including every subdivision down to
the smallest system or subsystem. The fleet model will
essentially be a tier of models built one on the other in a
dependent chain. Thus, every component or man contributing to the
completion of a task will have a functional relationship built into
the models. Just how essential to readiness each of these
contributing entities is can be expressed numerically on a scale
to l. 2
•*-U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Supplies and
Accounts, METRI. Military Essentiality Through Readiness Indices ,




The model is constructed to cover any desired depth or
scope of operations—everything from the fleet as an entity at the
top to the individual bits and pieces at the bottom. Bach ship,
function, system, or component with its subcomponents is plotted.
The model not only includes items of equipment but personnel,
money, food and all items that affect the performance of the ship.
The one consistent Justification for each system described
thus far is readiness measurement. Most of the decision-making
problems facing management of naval forces center on the ability
to measure the military performance of units or forces within a
variety of environments. The bureaus, as evidenced by the stated
objectives of their information systems, are concerned with budget
requirements and the allocation of resources made avllable to the
fleet afloat and to the logistics support ashore in order to
maintain a high readiness posture.
The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts has expressed the same
concern for allocation to increase readiness, and is trying to
answer a series of questions regarding the distribution of
resources and the return on Investment that can be expected as a
result of decisions made. For example, how to determine the value
of trade-offs between "reliability of equipments" versus
"maintainability of equipments by personnel" or "intense training
of personnel" versus "additional manpower on board"? Would it be
better to increase the inventories both ashore and afloat or to
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improve transportation and communication between supply sources?
Would it be better to add on maintenance tools, equipment and
skills aboc.rd ship rather than use tender support or yards for
the more sophisticated repairs? Would it be better to have
redundancy of equipment aboard ship rather than back up inventories
and trained maintenance personnel?
The Bureau regards these and many other questions as
having a direct effect on the performance of the force unit and
feels they must be recognized when decisions are made regarding
allocation of funds.
A prototype (force-unit) model, the U3S ELLISON, is being
used by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to test and evaluate
the possible applications and problem-solving techniques of K£TRI
in the areas of design, personnel, maintenance, inventories, etc.
The Bureau claims that results attained will assist management in
the acute problems of budget requirements and resources allocation.
It further claims that each of these areas of interest can be
analyzed using the test model for evaluating possible solutions
to problem areas.
Summary
The systems described here operate in addition to the
classified systems such as those for ordnance reporting, fuel oil
"^U. S. Department of the Navy, METRI, (unpublished pamphlet




management, tactical data, and other command and control systems.
Information retrieval is a vast and complicated business in a
large military organization.
A pattern becomes readily apparent in a review of these
brief descriptions of management information systems used within
the Navy. It shows that each bureau and major office has an
information system which appears to have caused or emphasized
several problem areas in the Navy's information retrieval efforts.
Undoubtedly, several of these information systems overlap
each other. For instance, both Military .Essentiality Through
Readiness Indices and the Navy Maintenance and Material Management
Information System have a3 one of their prime objectives material
readiness measurements of the same equipments. Additionally,
many of the systems report both financial and personnel information
from the same activity (e.g., naval air stations, naval ships, or
naval hospitals).
It is apparent from an analysis of the planning information
available for the individual systems that each one is in a
different stage of development. The Bureau of Yards and Docks has
just begun a study for a system. On the other hand, the Bureau
of Weapons has nearly completed the installation of its Industrial
Naval Air Station systems and has been charging forward on MMXX8«
While it can be seen that there is a considerable amount
of duplication within the Navy in its approach to management
information, It is, nevertheless, difficult to envision how the
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vast amounts of information necessary for managing the Navy can
be efficiently integrated into one comprehensive system.
Additionally, it becomes clear that each bureau believes that it
must manage and control its own information system in order to
perform its function. This is illustrated by the resistance the
Navy Comptroller experienced when attempting to have the bureaus
report information through the finance centers before they were
able to analyze it. The bureaus insist that the information flow
through the bureaus and then to the Comptroller, as necessary.
Whether the bureaus are correct in this stand or not, the feeling
persists and must be considered in working towards an integrated
system—if that is to remain the Navy's goal.
An attempt will be made in the next chapter to determine
how effectively the Navy is moving forward in this area. Since
it is beyond the scope of this report to analyze the planning and
the attempts to coordinate every management information system
within the Navy, the Maintenance and Material Management Information
System (MMMIS) will be singled out for a detailed analysis. The
remainder of this report will include an analysis of the thinking
behind this program, and what attempts have been made to integrate
it into the broader context of an overall Navy management
information system.
The MMMIS program was selected for analysis because it
reports personnel, financial, and material data in addition to
maintenance data. If any system would need coordination with the
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other Navy systems, most of which report only financial or
personnel information, etc., this would undoubtedly be that system.

CHAPTER III
PLANNING AND COORDINATING NAVY MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The Navy Is currently in the process of developing an
information system for maintenance and material management. This
chapter will be presented in the form of an analysis of the
planning and design of this system, and the attempts to mesh the
interfaces of it and other information systems. The material will
include progress made since the inception of the program in 1963
until the present. The intent of this analysis is to determine if




In January, 1963, the Ohief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Issued OPNAV Instruction 5420.48 establishing the Maintenance and
Material Management Project Group for the purpose of recommending
to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics implementing




better management of the maintenance and material functions. 3-
The Bureau of Ships had been working on this same general problem
starting in 1962. 2
Policy Committees
Along with the creation of a Maintenance and Material
Management Group at Norfolk, OPNAV Instruction 5420.48 established
two Washington based committees to coordinate and direct the
efforts of the Norfolk operation. These committees were a
Steering Committee under the chairmanship of the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations for Logistics, and a subcommittee of the
Steering Committee, known as the Staff Working Group (SWG), to
be chaired by the Executive Secretary of the Steering Committee.
The Steering Committee, composed of high level personnel
from the Chief of Naval Operations staff and bureau representatives,
is a policy-making body. It is kept informed of both progress and
significant problems in its area of Interest through periodio
reports by its subcommittee, the Staff Working Group.
The Staff Working Group, directly responsible to the
Steering Committee, has the following primary missions:
1U. S. Department of the Navy Instruction, OPNAV 5420.48,
Maintenance Materiel Project Group. Establishment of .
January 15, 1963, p. 1.
2Interview with Prank W. Segal, The George Washington
University Logistics Research Project, November 6, 1964.




The development of a standard maintenance
planning and control system that will provide for
the uniform accomplishment of planned preventive
maintenance in all ships and aircraft squadrons of
the operating fleet.
The development of a system for collecting,
processing, analyzing, and distributing feedback
information that will enable line commanders and
bureaus to better carry out their management
functions in support of the operating forces.
The implementing program to achieve these objectives was
set forth in OPNAV Instruction 4700.16 of March 8, 1963. This
Instruction provided a time-phased plan of action for the
installation of a standard maintenance planning system, and a
related Maintenance and Material Management Information System
(MMMIS). 1
Research Study Team
To facilitate the design of the information system, the
Staff Working Group, in July, 1963, established a subcommittee
called the Research Study Team under the chairmanship of the
Office of Naval Research. 2 The .Research Study Team membership
included representatives from the bureaus, Ohief of Naval
Operations (0P-43), Office of Naval Material, Fleet Work Study
Group Atlantic, Office of Naval Research, and The George Washington
University Logistics Research Project. The primary objective of
the Research Study Team was the development of a research program
to determine the quantitative requirement for an information system
1U. S. Department of the Navy Instruction, OPNAV 4700.16,
Standard Navy Maintenance Management System . March 8, 1963, p. 1.
2Staff, The George Washington University Logistics Research
Project, A Survey of Information Requirements for Navy Maintenance
and Material Management . Serial T-170, April 15, 1964, p. 2.
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as a necessary prelude to its ultimate system design.
A description and analysis of how the above organization
for maintenance improvement has evolved in practice will afford
insight into how well the organization was conceived.
Maintenance and Material Management Project Group
The Maintenance and Material Management Group, located
at Norfolk, was assigned to work on the management improvement
program in two stages. The problem would be approached in terjis
of first standardizing maintenance and then developing an
information system. The Navy's rationale in this operation was
that it would be necessary to get the maintenance house in order
before meaningful data could be gathered for an information
system. Once this was accomplished, an information system would
help keep the standardization program intact.
The Planned Maintenance System
As its first task in the improvement program the project
group developed the Planned Maintenance System. This system is
primarily pointed towards preventive rather than corrective
maintenance. As an example, it systemlses the conduct of aircraft
Inspections by combining in convenient decks of Maintenance
Requirements Cards (MRO's) for every type aircraft, information
^Standard Navy Maintenance Management System, loc. clt .
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previously contained in the Handbook of Inspection Requirements
(HIR) and Handbook of Maintenance Instructions (HMI). The
Maintenance Requirements Oards and the Periodic Maintenance
Requirements Manual explain in what way inspections have to be
performed, how they should be performed, what skills, tools,
special equipment, etc. are required for their performance, what
safety precautions should be observed, and in what sequence
individual inspection actions should be accomplished. They provide
this information in a form readily accessible and understandable
by managers, planners, schedulers, and supervisors as well as
workers.
1
Logistics Research Project personnel claim that the tfavy
is getting several basic results from this planned maintenance.
Because maintenance procedures are now thoroughly documented in
maintenance manuals, the Navy can utilize certain personnel in
maintenance tasks which require abilities in excess of those
implied by their rated skills. Standard documentation will result
in a more uniform maintenance data base which will provide more
consistent and valid inputs to maintainability/availability models.
These models should improve maintenance procedures and engineering,
resulting in a longer life expectancy for maintained assets.
^U. S. Department of the Navy, Naval Aviation Maintenance
and Material Management Manual . November 15, 1964, p. 1-2.
2Frank W. Segal, Maintenance and Material Management
Information System Research Considerations . Technical Memorandum,
The George Washington University Loglstios Research Project, p. 18.
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It is reasonable to expect reduced retraining of
maintenance personnel who are shifted from one location to another
because of the uniform maintenance procedure. In a situation
where different activities practice different procedures in
maintaining the same kind of asset, it is necessary to tailor the
training of technicians to the particular activity where they are
stationed. Maintenance personnel that are transferred from one
activity to another require retraining in these circumstances.
Unscheduled maintenance actions will be minimized, and a
shipboard schedule of Planned Maintenance System should permit a
time distribution of planned maintenance which minimizes the down
time of components/equipments systems. Stated in equivalent
terms, the Planned Maintenance System permits maximization of the
ship's material readiness for war.
Naval air stations and carriers will be able to implement
a schedule of planned maintenance permitting a time allocation of
planned maintenance which minimizes the turnaround time of
aircraft.
Standard Maintenance Planning and Control System (MPOS )
Developing a Standard Maintenance Planning and Control
System was the second task undertaken by the project group. The
above system provides the data collection and data control portion
of the overall uniform Navy maintenance and material management
system. It includes the iSaintenanoe Planning System, but is more
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comprehensive in that it collects data and provides the
monitoring controls over planned maintenance. 1
One other system was implemented by the project group
with the help of the Research Study Team. An information system
(MMMIS) was required to verify the validity of the assumed basic
results of the Planned Maintenance System (PMS) and to guarantee
at a specified level of significance that no slippage was occurring
in PMS efficiency. An information system assures that adequate
information is transmitted to management so that it will know if
the expected performance of the Planned Maintenance System is
2being maintained.
The Maintenance and Material Management Project Group
instituted the Maintenance Planning and Control System, and as
its first direct contribution towards developing a complete
information system, collected data for an initial input analysis.
A brief description of the initial data collection and analysis
phase of MPOS is contained in the following paragraphs.
Source Data and Data Validation Procedures . The Data
and Data Validation Program conducted by the Project Group was
essentially a Navy Service Test involving AFM 66-1 procedures and
techniques. APM 66-1 is the designation for the U. S. Air Force




equivalent to MMMIS, and was used as a MMMIS prototype by the
Navy.*
This test was begun by the Project Group in cooperation
with The George Washington University Logistics Research Team
in September, 1963. The units supporting the test from its
inception were D3SR0N 32, the USS SIERRA (AD-18), the USS
PORRiSSTAL (CVA-59), Oceana Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia,
and Carrier Air Groups 6 and 8. Three Air Force maintenance forms
and the exception man-hour accounting concept were adopted for
use in the test. All of the collected data were keypunched on
location and sent, on a monthly basis, to the Logistics Research
p
Project for processing.
This initial data processing consisted of subjecting the
Maintenance Data Collection (MDO) and the parts used data to a
data admissibility test which the Logistics Research Project
refers to as a Data Validation Procedure. A data admissibility
test served as a filter which permitted only tnose Maintenance
Data Cards and Parts Used Data Cards having permissible entries
to continue on in the data processing system. Cards collected
through the Maintenance Planning and Control System (MPOS-I)
ISegal, op. cit .. p. 28.
2Frank W. Segal and Thomas C. Varley, Maintenance Planning
and Control System—Phase I. A Description of MPOS Data and Data
Validation Procedure , Technical Memorandum, The George Washington
University Logistics Research Project, July 24, 1964, p. 3.
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containing entries in the data fields that did not pass a certain
test were rejected.^*
In a report prepared by the Logistics Research Project two
conclusions were made on the basis of the early tests on the data
from MPOS-I. These conclusions were: (1) the ability of naval
units to record and collect maintenance information that contains
a reasonably low incidence of error is apparent, and (2) with
modifications to the procedures such as uniformity of data
submission, the incidence of error would be reduced considerably
for some participating activities UBA increase the value of the
collection system to all users.
The Logistics Research Project plans to continue
accumulation of a data base on the service test of AFM 56-1 in
order to support a supply phase of KMMIS research. This will give
insights into the effectiveness of the maintenance operating level
reports generated by the Navy MPCS. Also, the test will bring
considerable information to bear upon the problem of designing
management type reports to fulfill llavy requirements . Additionally
the servics xest will help develop an audit procedure, the
location of data processing facilities, and the basic maintenance-
action recording documents.
1Ibld .. p. 1.
2 lbid., p. 2.




As stated in the description of the organization for
maintenance improvement earlier in this chapter, the Research
Study Team was formed to assist the Project Group in determining
the requirements necessary for an information system. Basic to
this effort, in the view of the Research Study Team, was the
determination, through the device of a Formal User Survey, of the
requirement for maintenance and material information at each
management and command level.
Satisfying Managers 1 Needs at Least Cost
The principal objective of the User Survey was to obtain
insight into the design of alternative Maintenance and Material
Management Information Systems (MMMIS) alternatives ultimately to
be evaluated on a cost versus effectiveness basis. Prom the
standpoint of the MMMIS design study, costs were held to be related
to the quantity and complexity of data which would have to be
generated by personnel performing maintenance actions; effective-
ness measures were related to the incremental advantages (in terms
of management improvements) which resulted from successive
additions of data. While the User Survey was not designed to
develop explicit cost data or cost effectiveness criteria, it did
Istaff, Logistics Research Project, Survey of Information
Requirements , op. clt .. p. 2.
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have as an objective the delineation of alternative data systems
(alternatives in terms of integral MMMIS's, the integral systems
varying in terms of a specific quantity and complexity of data)
with a description of the potential end products inherent to the
most basic system and to increasingly more refined data collection
systems.
The Research Study Team designed the User Survey with
certain objectives in mind which would be complementary to a best
system determination. First, they would assess, by specific
activities, management levels, and functional areas, the Navy's
requirement for maintenance information. The concern with
functional areas is related to an Interest in evaluating data
requirement commonality and uniqueness over major management
areas; e.g., maintenance management per se . and material
effectiveness management (reliability, maintainability,
availability).
This assessment of requirements, through a survey
questionnaire, was designed to provide information on the
fundamental level of organization at which particular commands or
functional area managers require maintenance information. In
addition, the Research Study Team wanted to know the requirement
for identification information to particularize: (a) the object of
the maintenance aotion (the hardware entity on which maintenance
1Ibld .. pp. 2-5.
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is being performed), and (b) the resources (material and man-hours)
consumed In maintenance actions. Also it was necessary for
particular commands and functional area managers to know the
requirement for specific data elements which describe the nature
of the maintenance action, or the operational history of equipments
prior to the maintenance action.
The Research Study Team planned to assess, by commands and
functional area managers, the required timeliness of reporting
of maintenance information (dally, weekly, monthly, quarterly,
annually, exception basis). Information in this area was
considered essential to the ultimate selection of data processing
and communications equipment to effect a full-scale, operational
MMMIS program.
Finally, the Team would specify, through an analysis of
information made available by the survey of the content of
reporting forms generated as a direct result of maintenance
actions, the information content of master files, the availability
of which was also considered essential to the operation of a
MMMIS data processing center.
Management Products
The latest task being undertaken by the Research Study
Team is the exploration of the product potential inherent in the




to afford Navy management an insight into the growth in decision
power made possible by a growing maintenance management system
capability.
In November, 1964, the Logistics Research Project
published a report describing the product potential of MMMIS.^
It included the presentation of management data in two broad forms:
(1) management data made available through an interrogation
service to satisfy unscheduled requests by Navy customers for
answers to specific questions, and (2) management information
provided through routinely generated reports which have the
characteristic of being prepared on a controlled schedule with
a prescribed format.
A three-phased program has been established for management
product development, the schedule for executing the three phases
being related to Logistics Research Project assumptions on the
time periods in which required input data files will be available
at the Research Data Processing Facility. The exact dates of
these phases will depend on data availability. The following
schedule specifies, for each of the three phases: (1) the data
files which are required to execute the particular phase, (2) the
general class of products which can be planned for development
^•Karvin Denicoff and Henry Solomon, Description and
Scheduling of Management Products for the Navy i^alntenance and
Material Management (MMM) Program . Technical Memorandum, The




assuming the availability of the specified data files, (3) the
general time period in which the products will be available for
distribution. While the Navy objective is to develop products
of the type described for the assigned time period, questions
of priority of customer requirement tied to considerations of data,
subsystems and programmer availability will dictate the actual
list of products to be readied for distribution. 1
Phase I
Data Requirement: Maintenance Specific Data




Data Requirement: Maintenance Specific Data
Catalog Pile
Wage Rate file












Product Glass: Advanced Reliability-Usage
Data Pro duots
The Logistics Research Project will work on product
development as a continuing process. In addition to adding to
the list of management reports with new reports as new require-
ments materialize, they foresee each of the products growing in
sophistication and value. These improvements are expected to
result from such factors as (1) Increasing range and depth of
available data, (2) improved knowledge of customer needs, (3)
increasing employment, through expanded knowledge of customer
requirements, of management by exception principles.
A Conceptual Framework
As indicated in the foregoing analysis, a framework has
been developed for the implementation of a Maintenance and
Material Management Information System (MMMIS). It is also
apparent that the Research Study Team instituted or contemplated
several research projects designed to fill out this framework.
A brief summary of all the projects suggested will be included
here as a means of tying together the concept of the program.
Some of the projects should be considered short-term and concurrent
in nature and others long-term efforts.




On a long-term basis, research was to be directed to the
area of methodology which would benefit MMMIS. The most important
research in methodology was that concerned with military worth
concepts and measures relevant to maintenance and material
management. In addition, the development of maintainability/
availability models was essential as a basis of operational
readiness measures such as Material Readiness Index and a Material
Condition Indicator.
The Standard Ship and Aircraft Maintenance Planning and
Control System (MPOS) was to be so designed that it would
adequately serve as the source of the basic data. Development
of itMMIS and MPCS would proceed concurrently.
The Logistics Research Project recognized weaknesses in
the user questionnaire file and suggested a deeper probe in this
area.
Another important facet of research into developing an
MMMIS would be a thorough analysis of the Navy Service Test
involving AFM 66-1 procedures and techniques.
The most important area, or the essence of designing an
MMMIS in the opinion of the Logistics Research Project, was the
establishment of a general set of principles to be used as guides
iThis section is a summary of the recommendations contained
in Prank Segal's memorandum, Maintenance and Material Management
Information System Research Considerations , loo, oit .
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in designing several alternative versions of a MMMIS. These
principles should evolve from research Into methodology, the
Maintenance Planning Control System (MPCS), the MMMIS
questionnaire response file, and the Navy 66-1 service test.
Development of appropriate models to balance the cost of
Implementing and maintaining a particular MMMIS version against
its operational effectiveness constituted the next step so that
the decision maker could evaluate each alternate MMMIS which had
been designed.
Other areas of research concern the introduction of a
Maintenance Planning and Control System and a Maintenance and
Material Management Information System into Navy-related activity
of private industry, other services, and government agencies under
contract to the Navy for new construction, alterations, and
maintenance. Research into financial and cost accounting systems
is appropriate because of their interrelation with maintenance
and material management systems.
The Research Study Team intended to develop an optimum
location for the data processing facilities as the other research
progressed. The characteristics of the basic maintenance
documentation would also be developed In this manner. Specifically,
development of the basic maintenance documentation would be the
result of the questionnaire file, the service test of 66-1 and
the comparison of systems and would round out the total research
effort. Such documentation was to include the basic maintenance-
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action recording document and the general management reports of
maintenance information.
Research Results
it is difficult to find fault with the research effort
being expended on MMMIS by the Project Group and the Research
Study Team. The Team has taken detailed steps to determine the
information considered necessary to effectively manage Navy
maintenance. Painstaking research has been done to determine the
source data available to provide the end products required, and
when not available, how the source data can best be made
available.
The design of the system, including the source document,
processing facilities, and management products, is beginning to
take form. The source document has been standardized and
simplified so that one form suffices for all maintenance actions
at the organizational level. This document will evolve further,
however, due to the dynamic nature of the need for management
information and the pressure for change by managers who feel that
their wants were not satisfied in the first design. A conflict
arises because the management produots are statistical compromises
and do not satisfy one hundred percent of the need for information.^
An example of the pressure for change is the fact that the Navy
* Interview with Oomiaander W. 8« P?.nnln, Office of Naval
Research, (Code 436), December, 1964.
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Comptroller is now working to include more cost data in the
system.
^
The bureaus have published manuals describing completely
the preparation of the source document at the maintenance
activity. Additional manuals will instruct personnel how to
record cost data on the source document and how to punch this data
onto machine cards.
Keypunch operations are being located aboard all major
ships, tenders and bases so that local maintenance source data
can be punohed onto machine cards for eventual transfer to
computers. All primary naval operating bases and air stations
have, or will have, computers for use in receiving the data from
these cards and the preparation of maintenance reports for local
use. Duplicates of the machine cards prepared at the local level
are now being sent to The George Washington University Logistics
Hesearoh Computer Center where the data are transferred to a
computer in order to prepare higher level reports and build up
the central data files. This operation will he phased over to
the Maintenance Support Office at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania,
within two years. A.t that time Mechanicsburg will become the
central processing facility and the warehouse for the various
1W. W. Hill, U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Navy
Management, Remarks made to the Navy Graduate Financial
Management Class on January 24, 1965.




computer files and models. All higher level management products
will originate there. 1
While the Maintenance and Material Management Information
System seems well planned and designed, it la difficult on the
basis of the above analysis to discern the amount of coordination
taking place between the agencies affected by MMMIS. An attempt
will be made in the following section to identify such cooperation,
or the lack of it.
MMMIS Integration into Total Navy Requirements
Organization for Coordinating Information Systems
The coordinating agency in the Department of the Navy for
management information programs was, until recently, the Navy
Management Office (NMO). It was charged with providing for (a)
coordination of requirements for orientation, training ?.nd
staffing criteria; (b) maintenance and dissemination of information
equipment; (c) control of procurement; and (d) consolidation,
cross-servicing, establishment and disestablishment of punched
card and electronic data processing installations to achieve more
o
effective utilization and management."
^Interview with Dr. Robert Lundegard, Office of Naval
Research, (Oode 436), December, 1964.
2U. 8. Department of the tiavy Instruction SecNav P 10462.7,




The policy of the Department of the Navy was that the
responsibility for developing computer based information systems
rested firmly on the bureaus. In fulfilling this responsibility
the bureaus were to be guided and governed by the policies and
procedures promulgated by the Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy as the Department ADP Policy Official, the
latter to be given support by the Navy Management Office.
In effect, the Navy Management Office provided little more
to information systems coordination than a device to keep track
of equipment and approve or disapprove of plans to acquire
equipment. This relationship did not prove to be satisfactory,
as the Secretary of the Navy was not getting the type of
information he needed, nor the proper representation in the
pplanning for programs such as MMMIS and NOIS.
The above situation has now changed. In February, 1965 t
a new concept in controlling information went into effect,
resulting in a realignment of systems such as MMMIS in order to
more nearly satisfy the Secretary's requirements for information,
and afford more coordination between fiscal, engineering, supply
and personnel interests.*^
^O". 3. Department of the Navy Instruction SecNav P 10462. 7A,
Automatic Data Processing .Equipment Program . February 26, 1964,
p. IV-1.
2Hill, loc. clt .
3 Interview with Earl Kuhl, U*. S. Department of the Navy,
Management Analysis Group, February 2, 1965.
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Mr. Howard W. Merrill, the Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy, established the Office of Management
Information Systems to replace the Data Processing Division of the
Navy Management Office. The Office of Management Information
Systems, headed by an Admiral, serves as an information command
post and ensures that the needs of the Secretary are met by the
various management information systems. The Systems Office does
not plan installations. That function is left in the hands of the
bureaus as long as the requirements of the Secretary are
satisfied. 1
Personnel in the old Office of Navy Management have
indicated that the emphasis on management information for the
Secretary, which resulted in the setting up of an organization to
funnel all information through the information center, has a
disciplining effect on the bureaus. The facts seem to support
this opinion as seen below in the study of attempts to coordinate
2
maintenance information between the various interested parties.
Qoordlnatlng MMMIS at the Policy Level
Commander W. B. Fannin, of the Office of Naval Research,
and a member of the Research Study Team, believes that the
aggressive manner In which the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
llbid.
2Interview with Arthur Feenan, U. S. Department of the
Navy, Office of Navy Management, January, 1965.
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Logistics approached the Implementation of MMMIS has given the
program a great deal of Impetus. ^ As an example, when the usual
pleading about lack of resources was made, the bureaus were
informed that the program would be funded out of current monies,
and nothing was to hold up its progress. Commander Fannin
believes that several stumbling blocks were overcome due to the
high powered makeup of the Steering Committee.
The power of this committee is further evidenced by the
fact that the Office of the Navy Comptroller has been forced to
abandon its original plans for a cost information system based on
Information flowing up through the accounting system—namely,
through the Regional Finance Center computers. Instead, the cost
information system is to be partially oombined with the
maintenance information system. This was borne out by remarks
made by Rear Admiral Morris A. Hirsch, Deputy Comptroller, before
the Navy Graduate Financial Management Class on February 11, 1965.
Admiral Hirsch stated that the Comptroller was examining the
financial information content of the various management systems,
and would restructure the financial information system to mesh
with the requirements of the major management information systems.
The above information indicates that coordination is
taking place in top levels of authority. It should be noted,
however, that the cost information system and the maintenance
^Interview with Commander W. J3. Fannin, Office of Naval
Research, (Code 436), November 9, 1964.
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information system have been in the process of being implemented
for two years and only within the last few months has there been
a concerted effort to coordinate them.^ Further evidence of
coordination problems is contained in a memorandum prepared on
April 16, 1964, in the Bureau of Naval Weapons, commencing on an
Office of Naval Research report concerning the Maintenance and
2Material Management Information System. The statement says:
We share your concern over the growing cleavage
between development engineering, in-service
maintenance engineering and supply. DOD Instruction
3200.6, OPNAV Instructions 3910. 4A and 6A and BUWSPS
Instruction 3910. 2B all produce forces to tie the
acquisition management and engineering processes and
in-service maintenance engineering and support together.
However, here we are confronted with a strange anomaly,
in that each of these documents reflects strong inputs
from the T* (Readiness) Group. All of them except
WR-30 were released by activities whose prime concern
1b RDT&E or program management. '-fkUKM is a ^eep
difference In approach in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense between the Installation and Logistics,
Director of defense itesearch and Engineering and
Comptroller Groups. The Installations and Logistics
Group leans towards the "Symington Plan and 3ritish
Ministry of Supply" approach, the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering and Comptroller Groups are
tending to follow the principles published by Hitch and
MoKean, Peck and Scherer and Peter Drucker. The need
for "sensible" integration of design and maintenance
as co-equally flexible and responsive elements of a
"system design" approach seems to be better understood
In the OSD DDRAiS and Comptroller area than it is in
I&L.
'•Interview with Robert Greene, Office of the Navy
Comptroller, Data Processing, November 13, 1964.
o
^U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons,
Memorandum, FWHP-IiJW, April 16, 1964, p. 2.
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Other frictions at the policy level are indicated in
comments made in a memorandum from Rear Admiral B. 0. Christiansen,
Assistant Chief, Bureau of Weapons for Fleet Readiness and
Training, on June 15, 1964. In effect, the Assistant Chief,
BtfWEPS recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
take action to clearly define the Department of Defense Uniform
Maintenance Data Collection System, Standard Data Coding programs
and provide uniform definitions and classifications for the
elements of cost and management information to be obtained by
these systems. He claimed that the services were in the
production systems, while the uniform Department of Defense
maintenance data collection was still in preliminary design.
Taking note that there have been varying amounts of
cooperation and coordination at the policy level, this analysis
will proceed into the coordination at the working level of the
organization.
Coordinating MMMIS at Lower Levels
MMMIS is being designed to report information pertaining
to maintenance aotions about people, material, dollars, activity,
population, location and configuration. Because the system
crosses so many organizational fences, it is extremely difficult
U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons,
Memorandum, FWMP-l/106 :JFW, June 15, 1964, p. 3.
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to coordinate. For Instance, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
has traditionally reported most material Information, the Bureau
of Weapons reliability and maintainability information, and the
Comptroller the cost accounting information. The concept of the
MMMIS program is to tie this all together without duplicating any
reporting requirements. Problems arise in determining how each
agency will get the information necessary to fulfill its
responsibilities without duplicating efforts.
Captain E. B. Stever, who has spearheaded the source
document work of the Project Group, believes that the problems of
coordinating the information gathering at the bureau and operating
level have largely been solved. Representatives from all the
bureaus and interested offices have worked on designing the source
documents, and for the most part all parties are satisfied with
p
progress at this point.
This opinion is shared by Mr. Arthur Peenan of the Navy
Management Office, who has responsibility for the Secretary level
coordination of the MMMIS. When asked if there was oonfllct
^Interview with Jack Whltten, U. S. Department of the
Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons, Assistant Head, Maintenance
Engineering Program Branch, November 4, 1964.
2Interview with Captain E. B. Stever, U. S. Department of
the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Ship Material
Readiness, December, 1964.
^Peenan, loc. cit .
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between the various parties interested in the program (e.g., the
various bureaus), he indicated that there was none. Commander
Charles Braley, coordinator for the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts 1 portion of the KMHH source doouraent, also considered
the progress satisfactory.
Conversations with others throughout the bureaus, the
Office of Naval Research and the Navy Management Office would
indicate, however, that these points of view are not held by
everyone connected with the program. For example, there were
opinions expressed that the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
delayed for over a year in defining the problem and cooperating
in the design of a source document for use in determining the
what, why and where of material usage. Another stumbling block
was that the original comprehensive proposal by the Navy
Comptroller for financial source material was turned down
completely by the Research Study Team. Additionally, within the
Bureau of Ships, interested parties were in conflict concerning
the composition of the handbook for the program, which has placed
that bureau many months behind the Bureau of Naval Weapons in
implementing the system. The Bureau of Naval Personnel has also
been rather vague and uninterested in working on manpower concepts
^Telephone conversation with Commander Charles Braley,
U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
MMMIS Coordinator, March 3, 1965.
2This material is based on impressions gained from




for the maintenance information program. Many of these problem
areas are hopefully being eliminated, however, as indicated in
the following discussion.
In January, 1965, the MMMIS flow diagram looked basically
like Figure 1 below. This form of reporting failed to include
either material that had been consumed or useful cost accounting














Figure 1.—Diagram of NMKXS Before Mater L 1
Used and Cost Accounting
Information Was Included. a
U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research.
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Accounts and the Navy Comptroller are starting to work
aggressively on techniques to include this information in the
system. During February and March of 1965, aH the type
commanders, major supply centers, and bureau representatives were
wording together on a source document for use in gathering
consumption and financial information. The Comptroller entered
into the design of this document insofar as cost accounting was
involved. As a result, the program will look more like the
diagram in Fegure 2, which would appear to be a significant step
























Figure 2.—Diagram of MMMIS With Material
Used and Cost Account!
Information Included 8,
a
U. 3. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research,
llnterview with Commander W. B, Fannin, Office of Naval
Research (Code 436), March 3, 1965.
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The Bureau of Personnel has started to support MMMIS
wholeheartedly; as a result, the personnel people have been
working very closely with the Office of Naval Research concerning
personnel factors in MMMIS. Indicated in Figure 3 is the method
officials from the two activities are using to build a file
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J standards are I
l_established J
Figure 3.—Ohart Depicting Coordination
of Personnel Accounting and
MMMIS ,- a
U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research.
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standard work hours required to accomplish different types of
maintenance.
The original research considerations for MMMI3 Included
a readiness measurement concept. The officials responsible for
readiness were not satisfied with MMMIS as a means of measuring
daily readiness because of its slow speed; therefore, readiness
measurement, except in a long-term sense, has been eliminated from
the system by the Chief of Naval Operations. He will continue to
align readiness reporting separate from MMMIS with some provision
for trade-off of information. 2
All of the plans for readiness reporting were in a fluid
stage during the time research was done on this report. However,
a Fleet Readiness Analysis System Plan was being developed which
would provide for:^ (1) single readiness information system;
(2) a directory of the information recorded in Navy ADP files;
and (3) automatic retrieval of conclusions of long-term
significance to readiness (such as presented in the reports of
major exercises, operations, and operational analyses, and in the
Annual Reports of the Commanders in Chief). One example of the
^Captain Nicholas Brango, U. S. Department of the Navy,
Bureau of Naval Personnel Memoranda prepared for the Office of
Naval Research, 1965.
telephone conversation with Dr. Fredrick Moehle, Applied
Physics Laboratory, March 4, 1965. (Dr. Moehle is considered by
personnel in the Office of Naval Research to be an outstanding
authority on military readiness measurement).
^U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of




Importance of this to MMMIS is that flight hours and readiness
condition reports will go to the Naval Information Center by
dispatch or Automatic Data Network outside of the HDUI and then
selected portions of this information will be sent to the
Maintenance Support Office for inclusion in the MMMIS files.
The progress of coordinating the MMMIS within the context
of the Navy's total need for information has been satisfactory.
Nevertheless, some friction develops because the bureaus are
conscious of the fact that knowledge is power, and believe that
the manager controlling the information system has the power.
This is reflected in the struggle by each bureau and office to
have an Information system. However, careful design seems to be
ensuring that a relatively integrated system can be implemented
and still satisfy this legitimate desire for control of






An analysis of the planning carried out In the Navy's
management information program reveals that several of the
management concepts which were discussed in Chapter I have
parallels in Navy management. For instance, a system that will
report all maintenance activity to a central processing facility
will certainly increase the quantity of information available to
top managers in the Defense establishment. Additionally, the
thought required in designing the system, and especially the
designing of a collection method and end product report, is
forcing the Navy to think through its management procedures
thoroughly. The techniques of military worth measurements and
cost effectiveness analysis point up shortcomings in military
programs and spotlight strong points.
An attempt is being made, as Indicated in the Logistics
Research Project writings, to point the Maintenance and Material
Management program towards a growth of decision power in the




analyses procedures provide methods for decision making which aid
in this growth. Because these methods are used at the top of the
organization, the net effect in the military is to move the
decision making level in the organization to a higher step.
If data enter the system at the shop level and are
processed by machines for reports to the bureau and Department of
Defense managers, several layers of middle people are eliminated
from the information chain. This would suggest that some of the
present Navy organizational layering is not necessary if much of
the compilation and forwarding of data is taken over by the data
system.
Whisler and Shultz mention the tendency to speed up
decision-making as a result of the computer. Because automatic
machines process data and prepare reports more rapidly than manual
preparation, this would seem to be a characteristic of the Navy
information system. Even more important to rapid decision making
than the speed of gathering information is the capability of
having a complete base of data available instantly. Comprehensive
data files and models built up by modern information systems
within the Navy have this characteristic.
The analogy between the concepts suggested by the
academicians and those inherent in the Navy's computer based
information systems is further apparent when the impact of the
systems on organization in the military departments is noted. The
systems are being implemented because of requirements of Department
.
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of Defense for more complete information on the management of
military assets in order to make decisions concerning these assets,
This factor can be construed as a centralizing tendency for
decision making, since the Department of Defense previously did
not make such decisions. The people at the Chicago conference
with Shultz and YThlsler were correct when they said the pressures
for change generated by the introduction of the new technology
are in the direotlon of centralization of decision making, of
control, and of coordination.
Systems Design i4ethodology
The recognized methodology necessary for planning and
designing the type of information systems which would help the
Navy embrace the concepts of this new technology was discussed in
Chapter I. This was done to determine a yardstick for use in
evaluating Navy planning and design of information systems.
Assuming that the "total-system" approach is the desirable
goal in systems design, the material suggested that the first task
in such a design is to determine the objectives and needs of the
organization and to clearly understand the existing information
system. By making a detailed study of the organizi ulon, it is
possible to determine the long-range objectives and design of an
information processing system that will enable it to operate more
effectively with minimized managed costs. After such a study,
most experts in system design suggest that the manager: (1) define
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what system is being used at present; (2) evolve short-range
improvements to the existing system; (3) establish a time schedule
and assign responsibility for accomplishing the long-range
objectives; and (4) accomplish the plan.
Navy's Goal of an Integrated System
The Secretary of the Navy established a goal in 1959 which
called for the eventual integration of all management information
systems. A time schedule and guideposts were established for the
attainment of this goal. Design methodology similar to that
suggested by most contemporary systems design experts was
recommended by the Executive Office of the Secretary of the Navy
for use by bureaus and offices planning Information systems.
While the Navy had established the goal of a "total-system 1
several years ago, and indicated that it knew how this goal could
be attained, there is evidence that progress was considerably
slower than intended. This could possibly be explained because
of a lack of central direction and impetus which should have
been given by the Secretary of the Navy. Not until the Department
of Defense started to pressure the services about unified
readiness and budgetary reporting did the Navy begin to move
forward rapidly in the area of computer supported management
information systems.
Navy jfcinagement Information Systems
While the Navy may have been tardy in embracing the new
information technology, it gives every indication of making up for
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lost time. Chapter II contains a description of several of the
many information systems the Navy is currently attempting to
implement. This listing was made to highlight the magnitude of
the information gathering problem in a large organization such as
the Navy, and to determine the extent of duplication and overlap
in the present Navy approach to the Information problem.
Based on the descriptions contained in Chapter II, it
appeared that several of the systems being used by the Navy have
the same objectives or overlap. One example of this is the
similarity in concept of Military Essentiality through Readiness
Indices (MJ3TRI) and Maintenance and Material Management
Information System (MMMIS), in that both were organized to utilize
mathematical models of maintained assets as a decision-making
tool. Another example is that the Maintenance and Material
Management Information System includes manpower files almost
identical to those envisioned for Enlisted Personnel Simulation
System (MOON) and Computerized Advanced Personnel Requirements
Information (CAPRI). Additionally, the Navy Cost Information
System (NO IS) is being implemented to gather cost information on
weapon systems and subsystems according to program element codes,
while the concept of MMMIS includes similar maintenance cost
accounting techniques plus standard cost techniques.
Several systems have enough factors in common that they
offer outstanding opportunities for Integration. The most likely
prospects for integration are the Maintenance and Material
.
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Management Information System and those systems which have been
installed for reporting maintenance related information from
shipyards and industrial naval air stations. Also, the Cost and
Sconomic Information Systems, the Reliability Programs, the Navy
Cost Information System, and the Maintenance Management
Information System have enough important concepts in common to
suggest that they require a considerable amount of trade-off
among themselves.
Navy Design Methodology
In Chapter III the planning and design of the Maintenance
Material Management Information System (MMMIS) was analyzed with
the objective of determining how skilled the Navy was in making
order out of the seeming chaos in management information.
Considering the problems highlighted in Chapter II, and on the
basis of its performance with MMMIS, are there any indications
that the Navy has been able to make any progress towards an
integrated system? 3specially pertinent would be attempts to
mesh MMMIS with the myriad systems within the Navy.
The analysis and documentation in Chapter III establish
that the Navy, with the help of the Logistics Research Project at
The George Washington University, has done an outstanding job of
system design for the MMMIS program. An excellent organization
was established to implement the program, and the necessary
direction from the top down was evident. Similarly, the research
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goals and project milestones were competently thought out.
There has always been the nagging problem, however, of
coordinating the various managers' needs for information. This
problem is documented at all levels of the Defense establishment
from the Secretary down to the operating unit level. It is
accentuated by the functional approach to management in the
department in that each functional area has its own manager at
several levels; consequently, management information systems reach
down to the operational level in the manner of several parallel
pipes. There is some modification of this in MMMIS, but as the
system becomes less theory and more practice, it is beginning to
show this parallel pipeline characteristic.
Conclusions
While it has been established that the Navy is capable of
satisfactorily designing and coordinating such a complicated and
comprehensive system as Maintenance and Material Management
Information System (MMMIS), it has also been established that
integrating all management information is a difficult task. This
conclusion is based on two observations: First, the obvious need
for each functional manager to have his own information system if
the Department is to continue on a functional basis; second, the
fact that the magnitude of the information gathering problem would
swamp any integrated system. iSven in the MMMIS program itself,
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because of problems of coordination, the maintenance, material
usage, readiness, and fiscal information gathering functions are
evolving more in a parallel manner with trade-offs than as a
single flow concept.
This analysis suggests that the Navy has three choices
in the techniques it can use to manage information systems. At
the one extreme, each bureau or major office would plan for its
own information system. This is the stated policy of the Navy,
with the exception that the Secretary's needs must be fulfilled
by all divisions. At the other extreme, the Navy would centralize
planning for information systems and design a monolithic system
to include all reporting. The analysis indicates that a middle
ground approach between these extremes is actually being used,
especially when conflicts occur. The present method is not
necessarily the ideal approach, but It works when enough pressure
is applied from the top down, such as occurred to some extent in
the Maintenance and Material Management Information System program.
It seems conclusive that the Navy cannot, as it had hoped,
manage its information systems on a completely integrated basis.
It is doubtful, however, that the goal of one integrated system
was a desirable goal in the first place. Because of the sheer
volume of information required by the various managers, the Navy
would probably not be able to manipulate this information
successfully. The best course is probably to integrate systems
as much as possible, with each bureau being responsible for its
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